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Thrown into Crisis?
German-American Relations in a Period of Strategic Change
Peter Rudolf
Recent tensions at the governmental level do not yet add up to a crisis in German-
American relations. But political divergences and dissonances are an expression of
structural conflicts in the transatlantic relationship that have been intensified by the
post-September 11 strategy shift in American global policy. The emerging paradigm
shift in U.S. foreign policy confronts Germanys policy toward the United States with
new challenges. These challenges cannot be mastered through either unreflective
opposition or reflexive loyalty; rather, they require a strategically conscious approach
toward the United States.
Such an astute observer as Henry Kissinger
already speaks about a «crisis» in German-
American relations. Kissinger attributes
responsibility to the way in which Chancel-
lor Gerhard Schröder handled the topic of
Iraq in the recent German election cam-
paign. The electoral benefits derived from
this strategy allegedly suggest that a kind of
anti-Americanism may have become «a per-
manent temptation of German politics.» Yet
according to Kissingers thesis, the issue of
Iraq is merely «a pretext for a reorientation
of German foreign policy in a more nation-
al direction.» The new «German way»  in
whose name Germany allegedly sought con-
frontation with the U.S. without consulting
other European states  represents a chal-
lenge not only to the U.S. but also to
Europe.
More than a decade after the disappear-
ance of the common threat of Soviet com-
munism, and after the departure of old
political elites that were shaped by the
experiences of World War II and the Cold
War, does the special German-American
relationship finally belong to history? Is it
accurate to argue that German foreign
policy is moving in the direction of uni-
lateralism and nationalism? Twelve years
after unification, is Germany finally
fulfilling the expectations of those U.S.
security policy experts who could not
imagine that Germanys leaders had
internalized constraints on the use of
power and come to understand national
interests in a multilateral sense?
From a «realist» view of international
relations, it was expected that, after the end
of the Cold War, Germany would turn
toward a nationalistic foreign policy stance
that increasingly emphasizes and asserts its
own interests. Whoever shares this view
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must certainly interpret the confrontation
over Iraq as an indication of such a develop-
ment. From this perspective, the strain in
U.S.German government relations is a
harbinger of a deeper crisis. But can one
seriously speak of a «crisis» in German-
American relations  a crisis that could
lead to a complete breakdown or even a
breaking off of relations? (Moreover: how
would such a pessimistic scenario con-
cretely unfold?)
One could speak of a crisis in German-
American relations if the geopolitical
premise of the relationship  the role of
the U.S. as a stabilizing force in Europe 
were called into question. Yet it is precisely
the foreign policy debates on both sides of
the Atlantic that demonstrate how durable
this premise remains. The U.S. remains
necessary as a European power  and this is
the core of the geopolitical premise  in
order to allay fears of an overly powerful
Germany. In the words of German Foreign
Minister Fischer, «Without transatlantic
relations in Europe, including the Europe
of today, Germany would immediately
assume a role for which we should defi-
nitely not strive. This would put too much
strain on us. The U.S. provides not only a
global balance; it also provides a balance
in Europe up to this very day.»
It may be the case that foreign policy
elites are still clinging to the old geopoliti-
cal premise while, in public opinion, a re-
evaluation of relations has long been taking
place that could eventually make its way
to the political level. In German public
opinion  in which the «big partner»
naturally plays a much more influential
role than Germany does in U.S. public
opinion  one can recognize a certain shift
toward a more skeptical view of the inter-
national role played by the U.S. The extent
of American power, and particularly its uni-
lateral deployment in the pursuit of narrow
national interests, appears to be the most
important factor contributing to a less
positive view of the U.S. in German public
opinion (see Der Spiegel, May 18, 2002,
pp. 2631). Nearly two-thirds of Germans
share the opinion that the U.S. is pursuing
only its own interests when it intervenes in
the worlds crisis regions. Less than 10 years
ago, in 1993, only 58 percent expressed this
opinion. An even more significant indicator
of changing attitudes toward the interna-
tional role of the U.S. is the declining
number of Germans who view the U.S.
as the guarantor of peace and security
throughout the world. In 2002 only 48
percent shared this view, compared to
62 percent in 1993. These changing figures
might be interpreted as an expression of
attitudes toward the policies of the current
U.S. president, which tend to be negative:
in spring 2002, only 19 percent of Germans
expressed a positive opinion of the current
president, while 50 percent held a negative
opinion.
In the case of Germany, however, less
positive attitudes toward the international
role of the U.S. might be connected to
frustrated expectations, i.e., the disap-
pointed hope for a relationship with the
U.S. that is based on real partnership. In
1993, when Germans were asked whether
the U.S. played a dominating role in
German-American relations or whether
Germany had become an equal partner,
opinions were still very mixed. Less than
10 years later, the German public appears
to have shed all illusions: 73 percent ascribe
a dominating role to the U.S., while 26 per-
cent still consider Germany an equal part-
ner. Nevertheless, a more skeptical view of
the United States should not be equated
with increasing anti-Americanism. The
number of persons holding self-declared
anti-American attitudes remains relatively
constant at one-fourth of the population.
Structural Conflicts in
Transatlantic Relations
This shift in public opinion reflects changes
in American foreign policy. And the prob-
lems that both the German public and
German foreign policy currently have with
the U.S.  its tendency to act unilaterally, its
avoidance of genuine consultations, and its
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disdain for international institutions  con-
verge over the issue of Iraq.
The issue of Iraq encompasses a number
of structural conflicts in transatlantic
relations that have been exacerbated by
strategic shifts in American foreign policy
under President Bush. Seen in this way, the
conflict over Iraq represents a deeper
estrangement in foreign policy that includes
divergent foreign policy priorities and dif-
ferent threat perceptions.
In a June 2002 article in Policy Review that
received considerable attention on both
sides of the Atlantic, Robert Kagan offered
an explanation for this development that is
certainly plausible at first glance: the tre-
mendous gap in military power between
the U.S. and Europe is causing an increas-
ing number of divergent foreign policy
perspectives  even ideologies. According to
Kagan, those with military strength develop
a propensity to use that strength. Those
who lack this strength develop an under-
standable aversion to the exercise of mili-
tary power. This gap in military resources
has a particularly strong effect on threat
perceptions. Consequently, Europe and the
U.S. apply different benchmarks to the
question of what constitutes a tolerable or
intolerable threat. Weakness causes states to
downplay or even ignore threats, a fact that
can easily be explained psychologically. Yet
these threats are also «objectively» different
for both sides. Kagan argues that, precisely
because of its power and its corresponding
international role as a guarantor of
stability, the U.S. is under a far greater
threat from «rogue states» such as Iraq.
Kagans argument appears quite per-
suasive. Yet  as numerous analysts have
objected  it disregards differences within
Europe itself. This applies particularly to
different traditions in the exercise of
military power (thus Kagan appears above
all to have Germany in mind when he
speaks of Europe). Furthermore, this type
of analysis elevates the foreign policy
perspectives and preferences of American
neoconservatives  and Kagan ranks as one
of the most highly published neo-
conservative analysts  to the level of U.S.
foreign policy «ideology.» Despite the fact
that the U.S. always pursues a sui generis
foreign policy due to its particular political
culture and its position of extraordinary
power, there are still diverse schools of
thought in the U.S. foreign policy establish-
ment. The extent to which U.S. strategy
diverges from that of Europe is not a given,
but rather depends among other things on
power constellations in Washington.
It is not true that  to borrow Kagans
now-famous dictum  Germans live on
Venus and Americans live on Mars. Rather,
it is those neoconservatives within the U.S.
foreign policy elite who live on another
planet  those «belligerent and divisive
voices,» in the words of former President
Carter, who currently set the tone in
Washington. A glance at the prevailing
collective preferences of both societies
reveals no fundamental divide in their
views of the world. Overall, a majority of
Americans and Europeans share a positive
view of international institutions. The
majority of the American public prefers
a multilateral rather than a unilateral
orientation toward foreign policy. Even
the Germans are far less negatively dis-
posed to the exercise of military power
than references to Mars and Venus imply.
However, the German public is mostly
inclined to support the exercise of military
power when it is used for humanitarian
interventions and the maintenance of the
international legal order. A majority of
Europeans also favor the use of military
power in the fight against terrorism (see
www.worldview.org).
A Strategy Shift in Washington
U.S. public opinion, which distinguishes
itself through a collective «rationality» and
considerable stability, does place con-
straints on foreign policy and serves as a
framework for discussions and decision-
making processes among American political
elites. Yet actual U.S. foreign policy can
occasionally diverge significantly from
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public opinion. This is especially the
case when the president, in situations of
heightened threat perception, succeeds in
increasing his power and influence relative
to Congress. September 11 provided Presi-
dent Bush with the opportunity to give a
strategic focus to American foreign policy.
However, in contrast to widespread hopes,
this opportunity was not used to adopt a
stronger multilateral approach but rather
to mobilize resources in favor of a strongly
military-oriented policy of global power.
Against the backdrop of an increased aware-
ness of asymmetrical threats, and using the
«war against terror» as a basis to gain
domestic political legitimacy, the school of
thought favoring the assertion of superior
military strength and unlimited freedom of
action succeeded in dominating the politi-
cal discourse in the U.S.
The policy that is becoming apparent
in Washington amounts to a profound
strategic change: a near-imperial global
political strategy is emerging that could in
the longer term lead to a crisis in trans-
atlantic relations. As analyzed by G. John
Ikenberry in the September/October issue of
Foreign Affairs, the contours of this new stra-
tegic «paradigm» can be clearly discerned.
Core elements of this strategy include: the
preservation of unipolarity, i.e., the main-
tenance of military supremacy regardless
of potential threats and adversaries; a
heightened perception of intolerable
threats, which has led to the rejection of
containment as the fundamental concept of
security policy with respect to the new
threats; and the preemptive or even pre-
ventive use of military force. As a conse-
quence, the U.S. wants to free itself from
constraints on the exercise of military
power. States that support terrorism in
whatever form no longer enjoy the pro-
tection of the principle of sovereignty.
The Iraq Controversy
This is the strategic context in which both
U.S. policy toward Iraq as well as the
German position must be evaluated. If one
takes a sober look at the problems and
dilemmas that U.S. policy toward Iraq has
raised, the position of the German federal
government appears by no means to be
as unreasonable as many critics believe,
despite all electoral tactics and all the
loud noise that surrounded the election
campaign. Without the well-known
putative or actual historical comparisons
between Bush and Hitler  which in any
case were completely incorrect and in-
sulting to American ears  the position
taken by Germany would never have had to
lead to such «poisoned» relations between
the German and American governments.
These comparisons made it easier for the
U.S. administration  in partly genuine,
partly staged indignation  to punish its
long-time ally with a withdrawal of
affection. The administration did so per-
haps with the intention of influencing
the German debate to its advantage, but
also with the goal of preventing other
states from engaging in that kind of blunt
criticism of its Iraq policy.
Political positions that are adopted with
electoral results in mind are not necessarily
devoid of strategic rationality. Whoever
considers it wrong and dangerous to pursue
a policy of regime change through military
intervention  and this is exactly what the
warnings and questions directed by the
German government to the United States
boil down to  logically cannot support a
coercive diplomacy whose demands for new
and unconditional weapons inspections are
largely instrumental. Upon closer look at
the American debate, this is the impression
that has been emerging forcefully for quite
some time, at the very latest since Vice
President Cheneys speech in late August
2002. Subsequent statements of U.S. policy
toward Iraq have continued to be character-
ized by ambiguous rhetoric. However,
doubt had long been cast on the assump-
tion that threats of regime change simply
served the purpose of achieving Iraqi dis-
armament, and that Secretary of State
Powell would ultimately convince the
president to accept new weapons inspec-
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tions. According to everything that is cur-
rently known, the fundamental decision to
overthrow Saddam Hussein, using military
means if necessary, appears to have been
made within the administration shortly
after September 11  without a formal
decision-making process, without a Nation-
al Intelligence Estimate to assess actual
threat levels, and within a small circle of
actors who largely share the same views.
If one had adopted the American line,
how could one then have credibly rejected
possible future American demands to
participate? This would have meant sup-
porting a policy that one objectively
considered wrong and overly risky even if
it were ultimately sanctioned by the UN
Security Council under U.S. pressure. The
doubts, criticisms, and questions expressed
by the German government were of the
kind that are repeatedly articulated in the
American debate as well: doubts concern-
ing the allegedly growing threat posed by
Iraq, doubts concerning the United States
willingness to be involved long-term in the
construction of a new order in Iraq and the
Middle East after a military intervention
had ended, and doubts concerning the wis-
dom of a policy that  in the midst of the
war against Islamist terrorism  sought to
open up a new conflict before progress had
been made toward achieving peace in the
Middle East. Yet it was an unusual provo-
cation when Chancellor Schröder  in an
interview with the New York Times  publicly
expressed such fundamental doubts about
the wisdom of American policy and
reproached the Bush administration for
changing its policy in favor of regime
change in Iraq without consulting its allies.
Given the state of the American debate, this
was certainly an appropriate attempt to
influence it  at the cost of creating bad
blood with the Bush administration, which
must have viewed such insubordination
from a loyal ally as unwelcome considering
the domestic controversies surrounding the
Iraq issue and the relatively «soft» support
of the American public for a potential war
with Iraq.
Those who argue that such actions have
reduced Germanys influence on American
policy to a minimum must be able to pre-
sent a plausible argument as to how a
different approach would have enabled
Germany to be more effective in influ-
encing U.S. policy. As a member of the UN
Security Council, France was at least able
to apply tactical brakes after the Bush
administration decided to work through
the United Nations in an effort to solidify
domestic political support and to show
consideration for Great Britain. Germany is
not able to exercise this form of influence
(although one can ask why Germany and
France did not agree early on to pursue a
common approach). There was no prospect
of a common European position from the
outset due to Great Britains one-sided
adoption of Washingtons stance. Never-
theless, Germanys reservations concerning
U.S. policy toward Iraq reflected a more
widespread European discomfort and not
just the predominant mood of the German
electorate. In this respect, Germany in no
way stood in isolation with its reservations.
A more serious critique is contained in
the assertion that the German govern-
ments sweeping rejection of even a
potential UN-sanctioned military interven-
tion represents, as Stefan Kornelius argued
in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, «a dramatic
change in German foreign policy away
from multilateralism and international
organizations.» The reason that this issue
is not debated may be, as he argues, that no
one takes such a foreign policy shift
seriously. Yet such a discussion would be
desirable, because the fundamental
question does not even appear to have been
asked: Should Germany support a policy
that is viewed as strategically incorrect and
morally dubious simply for the sake of a
multilaterally oriented foreign policy? Even
with a clear UN mandate and the conse-
quent legality of subsequent actions
according to international law, questions
would still remain concerning the strategic
rationality and moral legitimacy of a war
to overthrow the Iraqi regime.
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War and Its Justification
The «war against terror» and a potential
war against Iraq have raised the most
troublesome question for German foreign
policy and, as a result, for German-
American relations: How does one justify
the exercise of military force? Apart from
the left fringe of the German political and
intellectual elite, there was widespread
support for «Operation Enduring Freedom.»
Three-fifths of the German public sup-
ported the operation, and approximately
one-third did not. The intervention could
be justified as a legitimate form of self-
defense, even though the way in which the
war was conducted aroused concern. Yet it
was left to a group of German intellectuals,
responding to an open letter by prominent
American intellectuals that had received
widespread international attention, to
equate civilian casualties in Afghanistan
with the mass murders of September 11. In
their letter, these American intellectuals
had justified the war in Afghanistan by
referring to the principles of bellum justum,
or «just war.»
This tradition of «just war» could serve as
the basis for a common frame of reference
when assessing the moral legitimacy of
military intervention. Unfortunately, the
German intellectuals participating in this
transatlantic discussion refused to debate
this issue, in contrast to their colleagues in
the U.S. and Great Britain. There is a great
reluctance in Germany to apply the prin-
ciples of «just war,» even among those who
are not fundamental adherents of pacifism.
This is because these principles are per-
ceived as a dangerous form of legitimizing
war. There appears to be insufficient aware-
ness in Germany that references to the «just
war» tradition within the American debate
currently serve a largely critical function.
Certain participants in the lively Ameri-
can debate over the moral legitimacy of a
war to achieve regime change seek to apply
the classic criteria of the «just war» tradi-
tion. Following the example of the Catholic
church, a number of churches  including
Lutherans and Methodists  have expressed
criticism and doubt toward a war to
achieve regime change (support for such a
policy is heard only from the evangelical,
fundamentalist camp). These critical voices
make common reference to the classic
tradition in its current interpretation,
which is about elaborating limiting criteria
for the use of military force and evaluating
it on the basis of both principles and con-
sequences. This represents a critical chal-
lenge to those other American perspectives
on the legitimacy of war that are so proble-
matic from the German point of view: the
one being the «realist» view of international
relations that has few legal and moral
qualms regarding the use of military force
to assert national security interests; the
other being the view that wars against
«evil states» are morally justified and even
represent a moral obligation. This latter
view reflects what Senator William
Fulbright once called «the morality
of absolute self-assurance fired by the
crusading spirit.»
Challenges for German Policy
toward the United States
If eager neoconservatives succeed in trans-
forming the U.S. into a «crusader state» that
wages preventive wars, transatlantic
relations will suffer further estrangement.
But this development is in no way unavoid-
able; in fact, it is not even likely. It is highly
doubtful that September 11 has changed
the domestic political context of American
foreign policy to such a profound extent
that the imperial approach will gain the
upper hand. The current exceptional
foreign policy circumstances that have
strengthened the presidents power will
not persist in the long term.
It is to be hoped that, after long debates,
the logic of the «American system» (G. John
Ikenberry) will prevail. This «American
system» denotes the institutionalized form
of «benign hegemony» built up by the U.S.
after 1945, with its preference for multi-
lateral institutions and mechanisms that
enable other states to bring in their inter-
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ests and perspectives. Such a return to the
«old» strategic framework might be fostered
by influencing American debates and
decisions to the extent that this is at all
possible for external actors. This will be
no easy task for German and European
policies toward the U.S.
In the spirit of its own self-constraint,
Germany is interested in the continuation
of good transatlantic relations as the basic
framework for German foreign policy. This
is the widespread premise that guides
German political discourse. However, in
order for Europe to assert itself, it will be
necessary to change transatlantic relations
in the direction of cooperative balance. In
this field of tension, it will be necessary to
deal constructively with the transatlantic
dilemma that results from asymmetric
power and strategic divergence within the
alliance. If Germany were to reject the new
security agenda of the United States, the
U.S. could lose interest in the alliance, and
Germanys influence on the U.S. would
decline accordingly. If Germany fully aligns
itself with the American agenda, it will risk
a costly and perilous involvement in
policies over which it has little to no in-
fluence. It is a question of political judge-
ment as to how much the United States
interest in NATO would decline if its Euro-
pean allies refused to align themselves with
the global orientation of the Bush doctrine,
in which the «new» NATO and its center-
piece  the multinational NATO Response
Force proposed by the U.S.  play a pivotal
role. Pragmatically speaking, with or with-
out a Response Force, NATO will remain
important to the U.S. as an anchor of
stability in Europe. Due to its joint exercises
and planning procedures, NATO is a
security organization that, despite its
limited ability to act collectively, provides
a reservoir for «coalitions of the willing»
under American leadership. However, it can
be expected that Washington will continue
to send signals that call into question the
relevance of NATO in its «old» form and
that arouse German concerns about the
durability of transatlantic relations.
It is necessary to develop a strategically
conscious approach in dealing with the U.S.
 an approach that will vary according to
specific interests and problems. Depending
on considerations of costs and benefits, it is
possible to distinguish three fundamental
strategic options for dealing with specific
fields of conflict in transatlantic relations.
The first option involves «bandwagoning» or
adopting a position of solidarity with Amer-
ican policy. This might occur because
American actions coincide with European
interests, or because, in the case of diver-
gent interests, cooperation with the U.S.
would allow Europe to influence the
development of policies determined
primarily by the United States. The second
option involves «balancing,» i.e., the as-
sertion of separate European interests in
confrontation with the U.S. The third option
might be labeled «cooperative confron-
tation,» i.e., a refusal to follow current
American policy in order to improve pros-
pects for future cooperation. This might
occur because such a refusal would serve
to influence policy debates in the U.S., or
because an outright refusal, or an agree-
ment to adopt U.S. policy only under
specific conditions, would force the U.S.
administration to change its position. This
would be the case if a particular policy
could not be put into action without the
cooperation of significant allies. This is an
important point, because it is precisely the
non-military arena in which Europe has
important assets to offer or to refuse, a fact
that is frequently underestimated in Amer-
ican discussions. The more the U.S. faces the
unwanted task of «nation-building» (e.g., in
Afghanistan or, if Saddam Hussein is over-
thrown, in Iraq), the more it will have to
rely on cooperative efforts.
Political discourse and the coordination
of policy in crucial new areas represent the
challenge to transatlantic relations. The
overall situation in the Middle East con-
fronts U.S.-European relations with extra-
ordinarily complex questions. It is in the
Middle East that a reservoir of recruits
exists for Islamist terrorism. It is here that
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Iran, considered by the U.S. to be a
«terrorist state,» might have nuclear
weapons at its disposal in the not too
distant future. It is here that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict continues to await
a solution. And it is here that the political
and economic development of many states
provides little reason for hope. More than
ever, this region will be the focal point of
American attention and will therefore by
necessity be a crucial aspect of transatlantic
policy coordination. The task will be to
incorporate the new agenda propagated not
only by American neoconservatives  in-
cluding the political opening and democra-
tization of Arab-Islamic states  without
succumbing to the naïve illusions and im-
perial temptations of this agenda. German
policy should attempt early on to influence
the U.S. debate and the transatlantic
agenda. It should not  as has been the case
with Iraq  leave the initiative entirely to
the U.S. and take action only reactively,
without its own concept, after the room for
maneuver has become very narrow.
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